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1. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a significant revival of interest in arrangements that limit a country’s 
freedom to determine its own exchange rate. Writers such as Beddoes (1999) and Rogoff (2002) go 
so far as to suggest that the world is heading towards just two or three major currency regions in the 
long term. In any event, the number of distinct and independent currencies probably peaked in the late 
1990s.
2 The birth of the euro represents a major change to what Cohen (1998) calls the “geography of 
money”. Other regional currency areas (RCAs) are under consideration and there are prospects of 
other countries following Ecuador in unilaterally adopting a foreign currency. 
The move to form currency areas has accompanied initiatives (or been seen as a means) to 
strengthen regional integration, and has thus had an important political as well as economic 
component. The purely economic benefits of a common currency are still subject to intense debate. 
However, it has been argued that there are good reasons why especially smaller countries exhibit 
what Calvo and Reinhart (2002) have dubbed a “fear of floating”. The postwar Bretton Woods system 
addressed these concerns with a system of pegged exchange rates, but the system was predicated on 
the existence of capital controls. As industrial countries removed capital controls, speculative 
pressures developed that swamped the attempts of governments to defend parities, and the pegged 
exchange rate system was abandoned in 1973. Despite this, many developing countries retained 
pegged rates (formally or informally) long after the major economies moved to floating rate regimes. 
Events in recent years have shown that fixed-but-adjustable pegs in emerging economies are also 
vulnerable to speculative attacks and may no longer be credible. Currency boards, common 
currencies, and the unilateral adoption of another currency are sometimes presented as the only 
viable alternatives to floating, helping to explain the current interest in these policy regimes.
3 This 
paper discusses the economic issues that arise with such arrangements, as well as some similar 
issues arising when a foreign currency unofficially supplements the national currency.  
Section 2 of this paper examines motives for abandoning an independent national currency, including 
the various factors considered in the optimum currency areas literature. It also examines how far a 
common currency fosters the development of local financial markets. Section 3 considers and 
contrasts three alternative regimes: regional currency areas, currency boards, and the adoption of a 
foreign currency. (Supporting material is provided in Annexes A, B and C respectively.) A brief 
conclusion follows. 
                                                       
1  The authors’ opinions are not necessarily shared by the BIS or the Brookings Institution. They thank Palle Andersen, 
Corrinne Ho, Arwen Hopkins, Marc Klau, Kitty Lai, Dubravko Mihaljek, Kurt Schuler, Philip Turner, Bill White, Brett Winton 
and participants at the meeting for comments and Marc Klau and Michela Scatigna for preparing some of the tables. 
2  This 20th century peak occurred after the establishment of new currencies by the former republics of the USSR and 
Yugoslavia and before the introduction of the euro. In earlier times there were many more currencies; Einaudi (2002) 
suggests around 2,000 currencies existed in Europe in the 16th century and Toniolo et al (2003) that in the middle of the 
19th century there were over 270 types of legal tender coins just in the Italian peninsula. 
3  However, Masson (2000) and Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002) do not find strong evidence supporting the elimination of 
intermediate regimes in favour of the two poles of free floating or hard pegs, as implied by the “hollowing out” hypothesis.  
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2.  Why do sovereign nations forgo an independent currency? 
Often the decision to forgo an independent currency has political economy aspects, as mentioned 
above. The move from a national to a regional currency can help to cement closer political 
collaboration. This is especially evident in Europe, where the creation of the euro area culminated a 
50-year period of policy coordination and the creation of supranational institutions. The creation of a 
regional currency is also viewed as an important symbol of increasing regional cooperation in Africa, 
the Middle East and Asia. 
Handing over control of monetary policy to a regional or foreign central bank not under the sway of (or 
at least less influenced by) any individual government may be an indirect way of gaining the benefits of 
central bank independence. A lack of such independence is often regarded as a prime reason for the 
poor performance of monetary policies in many emerging economies. Furthermore, the criteria set for 
joining or remaining in an RCA may prompt more or faster economic reforms. Regional surveillance 
procedures may apply “peer pressure” on governments to undertake needed structural reforms, in 
areas where interest groups make change difficult.
4 On the other hand, there is a risk that unilaterally 
adopting another currency is seen as an alternative to harder but more beneficial reforms. 
The purely economic case for keeping or rejecting an independent currency and monetary policy is 
contentious. On the one hand, a partially or completely flexible exchange rate - for all but very small 
economies - can speed adjustment to changing conditions and can insulate the economy from 
temporary external shocks (such as commodity price swings, changes in sentiment in international 
capital markets and so on). Table 1 suggests that floating exchange rates in commodity-exporting 
countries often tend to reduce the local currency volatility of export prices, relative to their volatility had 
the country pegged to the US dollar.  
 
Table 1 
Floating exchange rate regimes: volatility of export prices
1 
  In domestic currency  In US dollar terms 
Australia
2   6.5   9.4 
Canada   4.6   4.1 
Chile
2,3   10.2   18.0 
Mexico   4.1    15.0 
New Zealand
2   12.7   9.8 
Norway   24.3   11.9 
South Africa
2   12.0   17.2 
United  Kingdom   4.1   5.9 
1  Standard deviation of monthly unit value indices, seasonally adjusted, over 1995-2002.   
2  Quarterly data.   
3  1997-2002. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
On the other hand, the benefits and costs of a common currency in facilitating international 
transactions, both in trade and capital markets, have long been discussed. This literature is surveyed 
in Box A. In very open economies, a rigid link to a credible currency should also anchor inflation and 
inflationary expectations.  
                                                       
4   Von Hagen and Mundschenk (2002) opine that within the European Union peer pressure has had more effect on large than 
on smaller countries.  
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Box A 
Currency fluctuations and trade 
For many years, the econometric literature struggled to find much effect of currency fluctuations on trade: see 
Brookes et al (2000) and McKenzie (1999) for surveys. Many articles find the effect insignificant and very few 
find it large. This is in contrast to survey evidence from firms where they often cite it as a deterrent. This 
apparent lack of impact is sometimes attributed to the availability of hedging instruments, although Wei (1999) 
casts some doubt on this. Furthermore, in practice, hedging is generally only effective for short-term 
exposures; see UK Treasury (2003a). For periods over a year, markets tend to be thinner and more expensive, 
although they may be gradually filling out: see Goldstein and Turner (2003). Furthermore, firms risk hedging 
future cash flows that do not eventuate, thereby unwittingly taking on a foreign exchange exposure. Using 
options rather than futures may avoid this problem but can seem very expensive. Taxation and accounting 
rules may also make long-term hedging unattractive: see Brookes et al (2000). Hedging is also likely to be 
harder or more costly for smaller firms. 
However, some more recent studies suggest that being in a single currency area is likely to encourage trade 
(perhaps over and above the elimination of currency fluctuations that a pegged rate would bring). McCallum 
(1995) finds that, after controlling for other relevant factors, trade between two Canadian provinces is 20 times 
larger than between a province and a US state. As Canada and the United States are similar culturally, 
linguistically and economically (notwithstanding some differences in taxes, laws, and to some extent language), 
a significant proportion of the difference would seem to reflect the different currencies.  
Rose (2002), Frankel and Rose (2002) and Rose and Engel (2002) report on studies suggesting two countries 
with a common currency on average have triple or more the bilateral trade; the effect is much stronger than 
with just a fixed exchange rate. Of course, this does not imply causality; perhaps countries that trade a lot are 
more likely to adopt a common currency. Tenreyro and Barro’s (2003) study addresses this endogeneity issue 
but still finds that currency unions strongly increase trade.  A time series study by Glick and Rose (2002) finds 
a smaller but still large effect; in countries leaving currency unions bilateral trade halved. Rose’s results have 
also been questioned as owing too much to very small, and so possibly unrepresentative, economies where 
there is not only currency union with a large country but also preferential tariffs, legal similarities, etc.
5 Mélitz 
(2001) finds that correcting for this selection bias lowers the estimated trade effect but leaves it high. Earlier 
work by Elbadawi (1997) concluded that the two African monetary unions exhibited very different effects on 
trade, after controlling for the “gravity model” determinants: in West Africa, monetary union seems to have 
stimulated trade in the early 1980s, but contracted it in the second half of the decade. In Central Africa, effects 
on trade were basically neutral. Ireland’s abandonment of its monetary union with the United Kingdom in 1979 
is also an interesting test: it appeared not to have any harmful effects; see Robson and Laidler (2002) and 
Thom and Walsh (2002). UK Treasury (2003a) report some evidence of higher trade within the euro area since 
adoption of the single currency. 
There is also evidence that in the previous “golden age of globalisation”, 1870-1913, countries on the gold 
standard traded more with each other than with countries not on the standard (after allowing for other relevant 
factors): see Flandreau and Maurel (2001). López-Córdova and Meissner (2001) report that countries with 
common currencies had even greater bilateral trade. 
 
The optimum currency areas literature 
Discussion of the appropriate geographic area for a common currency goes back at least to 
John Stuart Mill (1848, p 176). He trenchantly wrote “so much of barbarism, however, still remains in 
the transactions of most civilised nations that almost all independent countries choose to assert their 
nationality by having, to their own inconvenience and that of their neighbours, a peculiar currency of 
their own”. 
This desire for transactional simplicity, which pushed to its logical conclusion would imply a single 
currency for the whole world, needs to be put in a macroeconomic context. Mill and most other 
19th  century economists thought in terms of a world in which prices and wages were completely 
flexible. In such a world, adjustment to the real exchange rate is possible without any change in the 
nominal exchange rate. 
                                                       
5   When Nitsch (2002) and Kenen (2002) adopt what they view as better econometric procedures, they get smaller but still 
large trade effects from currency union; Persson (2001) gets much smaller, possibly insignificant, effects whereas Pakko 
and Wall (2001) and Klein (2002) claim there is no impact at all. See also Smith (2002).  
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In a world of nominal rigidities, however, this simple conclusion does not hold. In this case, 
transactional simplicity needs to be balanced against the desirability of conducting an independent 
monetary policy for stabilisation purposes. Analysis of this trade-off led to a large literature on optimum 
currency areas. 
The seminal theoretical work on optimum currency areas was that of Mundell (1961), who emphasised 
factor mobility: an optimum currency area is an area where factors are highly mobile internally but 
relatively immobile in moving outside the area. The degree of labour mobility has often entered the 
policy debate. For instance, it has been noted that labour mobility is much more limited within Europe, 
indeed even within individual European countries, than in the United States. But promoting labour 
mobility within the European Union has been an important objective of policy, and has culminated in 
the right of EU citizens to work in any EU country. Despite poor transport, labour mobility may be 
rather high within the African RCAs, aided by initiatives such as regional passports: see the paper by 
Strauss-Kahn in this volume. 
The subsequent literature has generally focused on the similarity of shocks and business cycles, trade 
links or similarities, wage and price flexibility and the extent of risk-sharing, especially through fiscal 
transfers: see Kang and Wang (2002) and Mongelli (2002) for recent summaries. Annex A includes a 
summary of the many empirical studies of whether groups of economies form optimum currency areas 
based on these criteria. 
Similarity of shocks and business cycles 
Economies subject to similar shocks should want similar monetary policy settings so there should be 
fewer conflicts arising over the common monetary policy stance. Less often mentioned is the size of 
shocks. If shocks are quite small, it should not matter much if they are not very highly correlated 
among economies sharing a currency; Table 2 shows this implies western Europe is better suited to a 
common currency than some other areas. As the paper by Pullicino and Demarco in this volume 
notes, economies with similar industrial structures or similar trading partners (particularly if the 
partners are each other) would be likely to experience similar shocks. An alternative view is that it is 
better for countries with dissimilar business cycles to hold their reserves jointly so that when one 
country experiences outflows the others experience inflows: see Mundell (1973). This is an argument 
for the pooling of reserves rather than for a common currency; the two are in principle separable. 
Looking at output correlations is a useful first step in thinking about optimum currency arrangements.
6 
The highest output correlation in Table 2 is not between any countries sharing a currency, but 
between Canada and the United States. The small western European economies in the euro area are 
also significantly correlated with western Europe as a whole. The Latin American countries are 
correlated among themselves but not with the rest of the world. The same is true for the Gulf 
economies. There are also some reasonably high correlations within Asia, but these are probably 
resulting from essentially one observation; the 1997-98 crisis. The African countries tend to have 
idiosyncratic shocks and show low correlations both with other regions and with each other. 
As well as differences in shocks, there are differences in how monetary policy affects the real 
economy. Factors such as extent of home (and direct equity and government bond) ownership; the 
extent to which it is funded by floating rather than fixed rate loans; the amount of consumer 
indebtedness; the dominance of, and competitiveness within, the domestic banking system; and the 
development of the corporate bond market may all alter the response of economies to interest rate 
fluctuations. If these differences are large, even if countries using the same currency face similar 
output gaps, they may initially require different interest rate adjustments to remove them. However, as 
the paper by Strauss-Kahn in this volume points out, the formation of an RCA may itself alter these 
factors.  
                                                       
6  In similar calculations by UK Treasury (2003b) for eight regions in the United States, over two thirds of the correlations were 
over 0.5. This provides one possible benchmark for assessing the results in Table 2.  
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Table 2 
Output correlations and volatility, 1976-2001 









Hong  Kong  SAR    –0.06   0.27   0.47    –0.24   0.53  4.1 
Indonesia    –0.28    –0.04   0.51   0.02   0.31  3.1 
Korea   0.05   0.27   0.48    –0.05    –0.10  3.7 
Malaysia    –0.24   0.03   0.40    –0.13   0.19  3.1 
Singapore    –0.12   0.11   0.31    –0.02   0.17  3.1 
Thailand    –0.34   0.03   0.65   0.04   0.03  2.4 
Argentina    –0.27   0.06    –0.23   0.13   0.43 
6.2 
Brazil   0.07   0.23   0.12    –0.01   0.78  3.6 
Mexico   0.21   0.11   0.22    –0.27   0.54  3.4 
Peru   0.14   0.04    –0.29   0.13   0.58  5.3 
Saudi  Arabia   0.48   0.16   0.32    –0.52   0.49 
4.8 
Botswana   0.62   0.25   0.56    –0.28   0.06 
5.1 
Cameroon   0.51   0.11    –0.04    –0.09   0.04  3.3 
Ghana    –0.54   0.33    –0.07   0.53   0.05  2.4 
Nigeria   –0.17   –0.09    0.24   –0.20    0.25  5.2 
South  Africa   0.42   0.16   0.14    –0.10   0.34  2.2 
Small western 
Europeans
2   0.76   0.20   0.31    –0.39   0.23  0.9 
Canada   0.69   0.83   0.06   0.12   0.31  2.1 
1    Average absolute change of annual percentage changes in real GDP.     
2    Simple average of correlations for Austria, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal. 
Sources: BIS estimates, based mostly on Maddison (2001) and IMF, World Economic Outlook. 
 
Trade patterns 
The higher the levels of trade between countries, the more closely output movements are likely to be 
correlated. Similar patterns of trade with third parties or a similar industrial composition of trade can 
have a comparable effect. Such similarities make it more likely that a shock to one country will lead to, 
or occur simultaneously with, a shock to the others. Trade patterns are summarised in Table 3.
7 It is 
rare for countries to have as large a share of their trade with a (potential) anchor currency as do the 
euro area members with each other.  
                                                       
7   The proportions of trade with the euro area and the United States shown in Table 3 are lower than the proportion of trade 
with countries using their currency or stable against it. For example, if the euro-using area is defined to also include Estonia 
and Lithuania, then the share of Latvia’s exports to it rises from 31% to 44%.  
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Table 3 
Destination of exports (origin of imports) as percentage of total; 2002 
  Euro area  USA  Japan  Other Asia  Africa  Middle 
East 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  64 (41)  2 (1)  0 (0)  0 (0)  1 (0)  2 (0) 
Bulgaria  52 (46)  5 (2)  0 (1)  1 (5)  1 (0)  3 (1) 
Croatia  50  (52)  2 (3)  1 (1)  0 (5)  4 (1)  1 (2) 
Latvia  28  (42)  7 (2)  1 (0)  2 (3)  1 (0)  1 (0) 
Malta  30  (48)  12 (5)  2 (5)  31  (22)  1 (0)  3 (2) 
Ukraine  22  (25)  3 (1)  1 (0)  13 (6)  5 (0)  6 (0) 
Argentina  17  (14)  11  (12)  1 (1)  11 (7)  3 (2)  5 (1) 
Bolivia  5 (8)  11  (13)  3 (2)  2 (3)  0 (0)  0 (0) 
Brazil  19 (22)  24 (23)  4  (3)  10 (11)  3  (7)  4  (3) 
Ecuador 17  (14)  39 (28)  3 (6)  6  (10)  0 (1)  0 (1) 
El Salvador  3  (9)  63 (39)  0 (2)  1 (7)  0 (0)  0 (0) 
Mexico  3 (9)  83  (69)  1 (3)  2  (10)  0 (0)  0 (0) 
Panama 15  (5)  48 (34)  1 (5)  2 (5)  0 (0)  0 (0) 
Ghana  42 (24)  7  (7)  4  (2)  5 (16)  11 (34)  0  (1) 
Nigeria  25  (32)  34 (9)  4 (2)  10  (30)  12 (4)  0 (1) 
South  Africa  27 (34)  13 (10)  9 (6)  12  (13)  15 (3)  3  (13) 
Bahrain 3  (18)  5 (12)  2 (7)  10  (13)  4 (1)  6  (36) 
Qatar 3  (39)  4 (9)  40 (10)  33 (13)  1  (0)  6 (13) 
Saudi Arabia  14  (25)  19 (11)  16 (9)  33  (25)  5 (3)  8 (5) 
United Arab Emirates  4  (23)  2 (8)  28 (7)  32  (35)  2 (1)  10  (11) 
Hong Kong SAR  9  (7)  19 (7)  5 (13)  49 (65)  1  (0)  2  (1) 
Korea  10  (9)  20 (15)  9 (20)  38 (28)  2  (1)  4 (14) 
Malaysia 10  (8)  21 (15)  11 (17)  47 (48)  1  (0)  2  (2) 
Belgium  61 (61)  8 (6)  1 (3)  5 (7)  2 (3)  3 (2) 
France  49 (56)  8 (7)  2 (2)  5 (6)  5 (4)  4 (2) 
Canada  3 (8)  88  (63)  2 (4)  3  (10)  0 (1)  0 (1) 
Note: Area to which currency is fixed (if any) is shown in bold. 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, June 2003. 
 
However, some central European countries come close, and for them the euro is an obvious anchor. 
The situation in the Americas is less clear. The United States accounts for a large proportion of trade 
in Ecuador and El Salvador, which have recently adopted the dollar, but for an even larger share in 
Canada and Mexico, which prefer to float. Despite its extensive use of the US dollar, Argentina trades 
more with the European Union than with the United States, as does Brazil. The European Union is the 
largest trading partner for most African and Middle Eastern countries. Asian trade is more diverse, with 
intraregional trade quite important. Hong Kong SAR’s trade with the US is relatively small but its link to 
the dollar also stabilises its exchange rate with mainland China, its dominant trading partner. It is rare 
for Japan to be a dominant trading partner (other than buying a lot of oil from Qatar) so it may not be 
surprising that no country uses the yen as an anchor. The “gravity model” of trade, which does quite 
well at explaining trade patterns, implies that trade between two economies is proportional to the 
product of their GDPs: see Rose (2002). This implies that small poor economies will not trade much 
with each other, and helps explain why there is relatively little trade within the African and eastern 
Caribbean RCAs.  
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The terms of trade are also relevant to the choice of exchange rate regime. Based on this criterion, it 
would not be desirable for Canada to adopt the US dollar despite its large trade with the United States 
as Canada is a commodity-exporter while the United States is a commodity importer. Table 4 provides 
some data on correlations between economies’ terms of trade. It suggests the Gulf States would be 
well suited to forming an RCA between themselves but it is not obvious they should link to either the 
dollar or the euro. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador all face similar terms of trade fluctuations, but 
these are nothing like those experienced by the United States. No country has terms of trade moving 




1 of terms of trade with those of: 
Countries Euro  area  USA  Japan  Other 
Argentina (Float)
2   –0.5   –0.5   –0.4  0.5  (Brazil) 
Bolivia (Peg)    –0.1    0.0    –0.0  0.6  (Brazil) 
Brazil  (Float)   0.3   0.2    –0.1  0.5  (Argentina) 
Ecuador (OU)    –0.8   – 0.9   –0.5  –0.3  (Brazil) 
El Salvador  (OU)    0.7    0.7   0.2  –0.6  (Mexico) 
Mexico  (Float)   –0.7   –0.8   –0.1  –0.2  (Brazil) 
Panama (OU)    0.3    0.4   –0.7  –0.7  (Mexico) 
South  Africa  (Float)   0.6   0.5   0.2     
Kuwait (Peg)    –0.9   – 1.0   –0.3  1.0  (Saudi  Arabia) 
Qatar (Peg)    –0.9   – 0.9   –0.4  0.9  (Saudi  Arabia) 
Saudi Arabia  (Peg)    –0.9   – 0.9   –0.4     
UAE (Peg)    –0.9   – 0.9   –0.4  1.0  (Saudi  Arabia) 
Hong Kong  (CyB)    0.2    0.4   –0.6  0.8  (China) 
Korea  (Float)   0.6   0.5   0.6  –0.3  (China) 
Malaysia (Peg)    –0.1    0.0   –0.8  0.3  (China) 
Belgium (RCA)    0.8   0.7   0.3  –0.2  (Switzerland) 
France (RCA)    0.7   0.6   0.6  –0.3  (Switzerland) 
Canada  (Float)   –0.8   –0.9   –0.3  0.5  (Australia) 
Australia  (Float)   –0.8   –0.4   –0.6  –0.7  (Korea) 
New  Zealand  (Float)   –0.4   –0.1    0.0  0.5  (Australia) 
Note: Area to which currency is fixed (if any) is shown in bold. OU: Official use of another currency. CyB: Currency board. 
1  Calculated over the period 1995-2002.   
2  Currency board until early 2002.  
Sources: Datastream; national sources. 
 
Firms inside an RCA can obviously invoice in their (common) domestic currency when trading with 
other members of the RCA. But by being part of a larger currency area, they are more able to invoice 
in the domestic currency when exporting to (and to a lesser extent, importing from) other countries too. 
This reduces the risk facing exporters, another benefit of a common currency.  
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Fiscal transfers 
Fiscal transfers across countries in an RCA could cushion them from asymmetric shocks. Income 
transfers from countries less affected by a particular shock could make up for losses of income and 
help keep labour and capital employed. There is much less scope for this within most RCAs, such as 
the euro area, than within federations such as the United States or Canada: see Bayoumi and Masson 
(1995). In particular, transfers across countries within Europe (which are in any case small) do not 
explicitly aim to provide offsets for differential shocks. In assessing the extent of fiscal transfers, it is 
necessary to distinguish the stabilisation (transfers in different directions in different years) and 
redistributive (transfers in similar directions over time) roles of fiscal policy. Redistribution seems less 
essential for the success of a monetary union than stabilisation, and the latter can in principle be 
performed by national governments. 
Since monetary policy is unable to respond to shocks hitting individual members, a monetary union 
may require greater national fiscal flexibility. But this may conflict with fiscal rules. In the past, 
EU countries seem to have been as successful in using national fiscal policies to carry out stabilisation 
as their (subnational) North American counterparts; see Bayoumi and Masson (1995). But the ultimate 
effect of the Stability and Growth Pact on fiscal flexibility in the euro area is still a matter of some 
debate. 
Other considerations 
Several other factors with a bearing on optimum currency areas are worth noting. It is often argued 
that it would be easier for countries sharing a currency to agree on goals (such as inflation targets; see 
below) if they are similar in their stages of development.
8 In most RCAs, per capita GDP in the richest 
country has exceeded that in the poorest by at most a factor of three. This would not be the case with 
some proposed RCAs, particularly in Asia (Table 5). It has also not been the case with the adoption of 
foreign currencies; because small poor economies would not gain much advantage from adopting the 
currency of another undeveloped country, they tend to adopt an international currency issued by a 
major industrial country. The paper by Foulo in this volume for instance argues that it is desirable for 
the link currency itself to be relatively stable against third currencies. Finally, if the different national 
currencies are already circulating within countries contemplating union, this will facilitate the 
introduction of a single currency. This was the case with the Scandinavian Currency Union. Euros are 
circulating in some of the countries aspiring to join the euro area and dollars are widely used in Latin 
America. 
A final point to highlight from the optimum currency area literature is that the criteria are to some 
extent endogenous. Joining an RCA or adopting a foreign currency may itself alter the characteristics 
of an economy, a point made in Mundell’s original article. For instance, it is likely to increase trade with 
countries using that currency, and so increase the correlation between their economic performances.
9 
For example, UK Treasury (2003b) finds some evidence of increased correlation between regions of 
the United States. In this way a country that appears to fail optimum currency area criteria before 
joining may satisfy them once it is inside. Such endogeneity has some bearing on the debate between 
those arguing that economies should meet convergence criteria before joining an RCA and those who 
argue this is less important as convergence will follow from joining: see Mundell (1993). 
Development of financial markets 
The creation of an RCA may spur the development of local financial markets. The paper by Al-Jasser 
and Al-Hamidy in this volume cites as a benefit of forming an RCA among GCC countries that it is 
expected to integrate and deepen financial markets. Yam (1999) commented that, as a long-term 
                                                       
8  It would also make it easier to agree on practical aspects such as the denomination at which coins give way to notes. 
9   A possible counterargument presented by Krugman (1991) is that forming an RCA may lead countries to specialise more in 
particular industries, making them more vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks and so less like an optimum currency area. The 
greater geographic concentration of industry in the United States than in Europe is cited in support. Rose and Engel (2002) 
find that after controlling for size, members of currency unions are no more specialised than those economies with their own 
currencies. However, Tenreyro and Barro (2003) find that currency unions decrease the co-movement of output, providing 
support for the specialisation hypothesis.  
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possibility, an RCA in Asia “would create larger and more liquid markets that are less susceptible to 
manipulation”. The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank aspires to create a “single financial space” within 
the region. In principle, a currency area could help overcome some of the disadvantages to countries 
in having “small” financial systems: see Bossone and Lee (2002). The capital market for the RCA 
could be larger and more liquid than in the individual country. There could be greater opportunities for 
banks to exploit economies of scale. 
How significant such gains are in practice is open to doubt, unless a common currency is also 
accompanied by other initiatives. It is true that entering an RCA might be expected to lead to banks 
with a more geographically and industrially diversified portfolio. However, the development of an 
integrated banking system depends on many factors other than the use of a common currency. For 
instance, van Beek et al (2000) find that domestic financial institutions in the Eastern Caribbean 
Currency Union often restrict their activities to their home country. This tendency is reinforced by 
restrictions on foreign ownership (even by companies from other member countries), different tax 
arrangements for non-members and prohibitions on residents’ purchase of foreign currency securities 
or real estate abroad. Even in Europe, few of the bank mergers since currency union have been cross-
border. In Africa, neither of the long-standing RCAs are very financially integrated: interbank markets 
are rudimentary and money transfers across borders take a long time. Indeed, Monga and 
Tchatchouang (1996) criticise the monetary union, and in particular the peg to the French franc, for 
having delayed financial development within these RCAs (by in effect routing transactions through 
Paris). The evidence for this is not straightforward: see the paper by Strauss-Kahn in this volume. 
Notably, the level of financial development of the members seems to be comparable to that of their 
neighbours. 
Similar considerations apply in the creation of deeper and more integrated capital markets. Larger 
markets tend to be more liquid and to attract foreign investors. A larger financial market will have more 
scope for specialised financial institutions. It also allows institutions to diversify credit risk without 
incurring foreign exchange risk. But a common currency by itself is no guarantee that such markets 
will develop. Divergent market practices, different legal, tax and regulatory regimes, capital controls 
and some countries’ wish to foster “their” financial market can all stand in the way of the necessary 
convergence. For example, the western African countries have a regional stock exchange, but in fact 
few companies are listed and transactions are few. The central African countries have a project to 
establish a regional stock market in Libreville, Gabon, but the Cameroonian authorities, with the 
region’s largest economy, have chosen to proceed with their own stock exchange, in Douala. Given 
the small number of actual and potential transactions, competition between the two exchanges is likely 
to hinder the establishment of a true regional financial market. 
Even Europe, which has made enormous progress, is still actively engaged in developing standard 
contracts and a more homogeneous trading structure. This was not created overnight along with the 
creation of a common currency. The Lamfalussy Group has examined ways of moving towards a more 
integrated financial market within the euro area. The advent of the euro appears to have led investors 
in fixed income markets to focus more on the characteristics of individual borrowers than the 
nationality of the issuer: see Barth et al (2002), Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001) and McCauley and 
White (1997). Similarly, prices in European equity markets increasingly reflect risk factors specific to 
industrial sectors rather than individual countries. Borrowers have benefited from easier access to a 
larger investor base. Stockmarkets have become more concentrated (for example, in the context of 
Euronext). But markets to some extent remain segmented because of national differences. For 
example, diverging market practices, arising partly from differing legal and taxation frameworks, are 
impeding development of pan-European collateral arrangements in money markets. Rivalries and 
regulatory incompatibilities continue to impede creation of a pan-European equity trading platform. 
A final note of caution is that the adoption of a common currency (linked, for example, to the dollar) will 
not necessarily mean that domestic interest rates fall to common currency (eg dollar) levels. While a 
firm commitment to use another currency, or fix rigidly to it, would virtually eliminate currency risk, it 
would not eliminate national credit risk. Credit risk premia appeared to fall in western Europe following 
the advent of the euro, and this might be expected elsewhere. One reason is less risk of a large 
devaluation forcing default on entities with currency mismatches. Credit risk premia could also fall if it 
were thought that other members of an RCA would provide support to prevent a default. However, it is 
possible that credit risk might even increase, as the country would no longer have the option of 
preventing default by issuing its own money. 
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Table 5 
Ratio of highest to lowest per capita incomes 
RCA Year  (Highest/lowest  members)   
Regional currency areas      
Scandinavian Currency Union  1870  (Denmark/Norway)    1.4 
Scandinavian Currency Union  1913  (Denmark/Norway)    1.6 
Latin Monetary Union
1 1870  (Belgium/Greece)    3.0 
Latin Monetary Union
1 1913  (Switzerland/Greece)    2.7 
Central Africa  1950  (Gabon/Chad)    6.2 
Central Africa  2002  (Equatorial Guinea/Chad)    5.6 
West Africa  1950  (Benin/Mali)    2.2 
West Africa  2002  (Senegal/Guinea-Bissau)    2.0 
Eastern Caribbean  2002  (Antigua and Barbuda/Dominica)    2.1 
Euro area  2002  (Austria
2/Portugal)   1.5 
Hypothetical regional currency 
areas 
    
Expanded euro area  2002  (Austria
2/Romania and Turkey)    4.5 
North America  2002  (USA/Mexico)    4.1 
Mercosur four  2002  (Uruguay/Paraguay)    2.7 
Arabian Gulf  2001  (Qatar/Oman)    3.3
3 
Andean Community  2002  (Colombia/Bolivia)    2.6 
Caribbean (CARICOM)  2002  (Bahamas/Haiti)   10.1 
East Africa  2002  (Uganda/Tanzania)    2.4 
West Africa (ECOWAS)  2002  (Ghana/Sierra Leone)    4.1 
Southeast Asia
4 2002  (Malaysia/Indonesia)    2.8 
ASEAN
5 2002  (Singapore/Cambodia)    14.5 
East Asia
6  2002  (Hong Kong SAR/Indonesia)    9.0 
Currency boards      
Linked to euro  2002  (euro area/Bosnia and Herzegovina)    4.3 
Linked to US dollar  2002  (United States/Djibouti)   16.9 
Linked to rand  2002  (South Africa/Lesotho)    3.6 
Official use of foreign currencies      
Users of US dollar
7 2002  (United  States/Ecuador)    11.2 
1    Data are not available for Bulgaria.     
2    Strictly speaking, the highest income is in the very small member state of 
Luxembourg, whose average income is 2.9 times that of Portugal and 8.1 times that of Bulgaria.   
3  Not on a PPP basis. 
4    Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.     
5    Data are not available for Brunei and Myanmar.     
6  China, 
Hong  Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.     
7    Data are not available for 
East Timor. 
Sources: Mostly based on data in Maddison (2001), van Beek et al (2000) and World Bank. 
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3.  Choosing between different rigid currency regimes 
Countries that give up an independent currency choose from broadly three types of policy: 
•  Regional currency area. There have been only a few cases of independent countries 
forming an RCA, or retaining one after gaining independence. (The adoption of a common 
currency has mostly resulted from political integration such as the unification of Italy in the 
1860s and the adoption of the constitution in the United States in 1789.) The most prominent 
RCA is the euro area; other current examples are the two CFA zones in Africa and the 
Eastern Caribbean Currency Area. Previous examples included the Latin Monetary Union 
and the Scandinavian Currency Union before the First World War. Annex A discusses these 
RCAs and the characteristics of their members. A number of governments in Africa and the 
Middle East have announced plans to form regional currency areas and the idea has also 
been discussed in other parts of the world; these are also described in Annex A.  
•  Currency board. This idea enjoyed something of a revival in the 1980s and 1990s with the 
(re-)adoption of a currency board by Hong Kong (in 1983) and Argentina (1991) and 
subsequently by four eastern European countries (see Tables 7 and 8).  
•  Official use of a foreign currency. There have been many cases where a small country 
(unilaterally) adopted the currency of a larger country, usually the US dollar or the euro, for 
its own use. Most examples are very small open countries, such as Kiribati and Nauru (see 
Table 9). More recently some medium-sized economies such as Ecuador and El Salvador 
have adopted the US dollar and the idea has been seriously discussed for larger economies 
such as Argentina.  
Although the choice between these options will be influenced by economic issues (for example the 
desirability or otherwise of retaining a degree of monetary independence), it often turns on political 
considerations. For example, RCAs are often part of regional integration initiatives with the creation of 
a regional monetary agency part of a process of building area-wide institutions. Often it is a matter of 
relative sizes; similar sized economies such as France and Germany are more likely to create a new 
regional currency issued by a supranational central bank, but a very large economy is unlikely to 
modify its currency arrangements to suit a very small economy. This can lead small economies to use 
currency boards or unilaterally adopt another currency. Of these two options, generally only currency 
boards allow the retention of seigniorage.
10 However, unless currency crises are very infrequent, the 
cost of lost seigniorage (see Annex C) is much less than the expected costs of currency crises. Simply 
adopting another currency solves the problem of monetary policy credibility by eliminating the need for 
a central bank. Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania are using a currency board as an interim measure in 
the transition to an RCA although other countries in the same position are floating or pegging: see the 
paper by Hristov and Zaimov in this volume and European Central Bank (2002). 
In some countries (see Table 10), lack of confidence in the domestic currency has led to an unofficial 
use of foreign currencies, often referred to as “currency substitution” or “de facto dollarisation”. 
Throughout history the currency of a major power has been used widely outside its borders when that 
currency has a reputation for holding its value.
11 Its use is particularly likely where the domestic 
                                                       
10  It may be possible to persuade the issuing central bank to share seigniorage with countries adopting the currency. 
South Africa shares seigniorage with the other rand-using countries; see Bogetić (2000) and the paper by van Zyl in this 
volume. US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers testified in 1999 that it would not be appropriate for the US authorities “to 
provide access to the Federal Reserve Discount Window, or adjust bank supervisory responsibilities or the procedures or 
orientation of US monetary policy in light of another country deciding to adopt the dollar” (cited in Kenen (2000)). This 
stance, sometimes called the “three no’s”, has been reiterated by other US officials (see eg the comments by Truman on 
page 154 of this volume), including those from the Federal Reserve. But Summers did not rule out sharing seigniorage. A 
bill put before the US Senate in early 2000 by Senator Mack would have provided for this, but despite being approved by the 
Senate Banking Committee it did not progress further. See the paper by Howard in this volume, Mack (2000) and Schuler 
(2000).  
11  The Athenian “owls” circulated widely during the fourth century BC. The Emperor Constantine introduced the solidus, which 
was in wide use from England to India until Byzantium fell to the crusaders in 1204. The Muslim dinar was also used in 
many countries from around 700 to 1000 AD. The florin of Florence, ducato of Venice and Spanish “pieces of eight” were 
widely used in the middle ages. The Dutch trading empire saw its silver liondaler circulate widely in the 17th century. 
Following Britain’s lead in the industrial revolution, the pound became a leading international currency and in the 
20th century its role was taken over by the US dollar. See Dwyer and Lothian (2002) and Einaudi (2002).  
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currency has a poor history, such as in much of eastern Europe and Latin America. The authorities 
may acquiesce in this process, encourage it by giving the foreign currency “legal tender” status, or 
discourage it to various degrees. 
Regional currency areas 
Nominal anchor for monetary policy 
A new common currency can either float or be fixed against a major international currency. The 
advantage of a floating currency is that it allows a degree of flexibility in dealing with, for example, 
cyclical divergence between the RCA and the rest of the world. At present, the only floating regional 
currency issued by a supranational central bank is the euro.
12 
An RCA with a floating exchange rate has to choose a policy anchor. As the act of forming an RCA is 
likely to alter the demand for money, relying solely on a monetary aggregate is unlikely to be desirable, 
at least initially. More plausible is a (formal or informal) inflation target. Choosing an inflation target is 
easier if the RCA members are at similar stages of development, have well developed financial 
markets (permitting the effective use of indirect monetary policy instruments) and have harmonised 
inflation indices,
13 as in the euro area. Choosing an inflation target for an RCA that contained both 
advanced and rapidly growing developing countries would be more difficult because relative prices are 
changing more sharply, given the Balassa-Samuelson effect (the tendency for the relative price of 
services to rise more quickly in poorer fast-growing economies). See Table 5 for examples of where 
this could prove a problem. 
If the decision is made to fix the new currency, then an anchor currency or basket of currencies must 
be selected. Choosing a basket of currencies corresponding to trade weights would stabilise the 
nominal effective exchange rate. Although this has a strong appeal (it would prevent essentially 
arbitrary changes in the effective exchange rate due to changes in the cross rates of major 
currencies), there are powerful counterarguments. One is that the public grasp the idea of a link with a 
single currency more easily than a link to some more abstract weighted average. Nevertheless, it has 
been suggested that Asian developing economies peg to a common basket of dollar, yen and euro, 
perhaps as an interim measure towards a common Asian currency: see for example Ito and Ogawa 
(2000) and Kim and Ryou (2001). 
Most regional currency areas have tied themselves to a single major currency. This choice depends in 
part on trade flows, but is also influenced by the current dominance of the dollar in international trade, 
finance, and in the pricing of commodities. The Gulf States introduced as a transition measure a 
requirement that all members peg to the dollar within agreed margins. The paper by Al-Jasser and 
Al-Hamidy in this volume explains that the dollar was chosen because it is the intervention currency, 
reserves are mostly held in dollars and the existing currencies have been (more or less) pegged to the 
dollar. Yet, as the Gulf States trade more with the euro area than with the United States, they could 
have instead chosen to gradually shift their reserves into euros. No decision has yet been made about 
whether the new Gulf currency will float or be fixed. 
There are different ways by which the regional monetary authority could maintain a fixed link with a 
major currency. One option is simply to give it the mandate (and the reserves!) to do so. The problem 
with this, however, is that such a new authority could lack credibility and, in the presence of high 
capital mobility, the link could be the object of speculative attacks. To address this, the regional 
monetary authority in the eastern Caribbean operates like a currency board. In the CFA franc zones, it 
is the French Treasury that ultimately guarantees the peg to the euro by allowing in principle unlimited 
overdrafts. Moreover, the arrangement triggers policy measures by the central bank and member 
countries if the central bank’s reserves fall below 20% of its sight liabilities, providing an extra 
guarantee. 
                                                       
12   The rand has a regional role in the Common Monetary Area, but is issued by South Africa’s central bank, and responsibility 
for monetary policy is not shared with the other (much smaller) countries of the CMA.  
13   Asante and Walton (2002) discuss the process of harmonising statistics in the proposed West African currency union.  
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Need for policy discipline 
Some of the expectations about what the adoption of a common currency can achieve may be 
unrealistic. For example, Table 5 shows it has not led to convergence in per capita incomes within the 
RCAs. A more general risk is that countries may become complacent about the external constraint - 
they may expect capital inflows to increase permanently. The nature of the external constraint may 
change with the adoption of a common currency, but it does not disappear. Countries that adopt an 
ambitious exchange rate target (for example, pegging to the euro) need to be quite sure that they can 
implement the macroeconomic stabilisation policies such ambitious targets require. If they are not able 
to do so, they may be led to impose payments restrictions in order to defend the exchange rate 
regime. In the past, many countries sought to defend exchange rate pegs by introducing (or 
tightening) restrictions on currency convertibility and rationing foreign exchange. These restrictions 
impede trade, distort prices, and encourage parallel currency markets. In the context of a single 
currency with limits on central bank financing, governments may find themselves unable to limit 
spending to match available financing, and be forced instead to incur arrears to employees, suppliers, 
and creditors. Arrears also have a corrosive effect on the economy’s efficiency. 
Rules for joining and belonging to a regional currency area 
Countries admitted to an RCA have to meet some rules. For example, rules may be needed to limit the 
actions of any local central bank that remains operational. In particular, any monetary financing of 
fiscal deficits should be limited, although this is not always respected. In the existing monetary unions 
in Africa (the CFA zones), for instance, monetary financing of deficits is not prohibited, but is limited by 
statute to 20% of a country’s previous year’s fiscal revenues. In practice the ceilings have been 
occasionally breached, and the ceilings were also generous enough to allow several of the larger 
countries to accumulate excessive indebtedness. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, governments 
managed to obtain central bank credit indirectly through borrowing from commercial banks that were 
under their control, which then refinanced themselves at the central bank: see Stasavage (1997). Both 
zones have approved in principle reforms that would prevent their central banks from any direct 
financing of government deficits, as in the euro area, but the timetable for their introduction is 
uncertain. The reforms need to be accompanied by the development of alternative financing sources 
for governments (in particular, regional bond and treasury bill markets), and involve regulatory and 
institutional changes.  
Other rules relate to macroeconomic performance. For instance, countries are often required to meet 
“convergence criteria”, both as an initial qualification for joining and as an ongoing membership rule.
14 
There are several general reasons for such requirements. Meeting such criteria demonstrates the 
firmness of a country’s commitment and establishes initial conditions that are less likely to produce 
problems should negative shocks subsequently occur: see Masson (1996). Further, the ability to 
satisfy convergence criteria is an indication that the political commitment may be durable. In addition, 
the more similar the countries’ initial macroeconomic situations, the less likely are their interests to 
subsequently diverge. The rules sometimes cover inflation; both the current inflation rate and the 
extent to which markets believe inflation will continue to be kept under control in the future. The latter 
is captured by setting criteria referring to long-term bond yields and exchange rates; if markets believe 
inflation is only temporarily low, bond yields will stay high and the exchange rate may well weaken. 
Criteria that are based on the ability to keep a country’s exchange rate within margins can easily be 
justified as a training ground for the monetary union’s permanently fixed parities. If countries are not 
flexible or committed enough to maintain these parities, this throws doubt on their ability to adapt to a 
common monetary policy. In Europe, the ERM served this role, but free capital movements and the 
attempt to maintain narrow margins while ruling out realignments, even when convergence of inflation 
and commitment to monetary union had not yet been demonstrated, led to the crises of 1992-93. With 
wider margins (plus or minus 15%), the system proved robust, and a similar system is to be applied to 
the EU accession countries, in the form of the ERM II. In Africa, the WAMI is helping put in place an 
                                                       
14   These should be measured using consistent definitions; Eurostat has played an important role in producing independent 
and harmonised data for the euro area.  
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exchange rate mechanism that will require countries entering the monetary union to keep their 
currencies within 15% of central parities calculated relative to the US dollar. 
Fiscal rules are among the most important and controversial criteria. One view is that no fiscal rule is 
needed other than the prohibition of the monetary financing of deficits. Countries within an RCA that 
run large fiscal deficits will thus be forced to issue bonds. The knowledge that such borrowing will 
increase debt servicing costs and may well lower their sovereign credit ratings will be a strong 
deterrent to large deficits. Market discipline can work even within an RCA - provided there are no 
bailouts. The counterview to this, however, is that a lack of market discipline in one country may harm 
other members. Such deficits and debt servicing burdens could put pressure on the central bank to 
lower interest rates and could reduce the resistance to inflation (as inflation lowers the real value of 
nominal debts). The credibility of the RCA’s central bank would be undermined, and all would suffer 
from higher interest rates. 
It is probably fair to argue that this counterview has prevailed in the policy debate. Most RCAs have 
incorporated various forms of fiscal criteria (see Table 6). But there has been much debate about the 
precise specification of such rules. Among the more important issues that have been raised are: 
•  Is there a need for a rule on both deficits and debt? Some have argued that a rule on the 
level of the debt/GDP ratio is most appropriate, allowing countries to decide within that 
ceiling when to run fiscal deficits. But deficit limits may be useful in slowing the growth of 
debt before the debt limit is reached. 
•  Should the ceiling for deficits vary with the cycle? There is a good logical case for fixing 
criteria in terms of cyclically-adjusted deficits but this would require an accepted authority to 
calculate such a measure. An alternative way of introducing some fiscal flexibility would be to 
suspend the rules in the event of a large recession (as in the euro area), or apply limits to the 
average deficit over the business cycle. But there are trade-offs between flexibility and the 
credibility that comes from simpler rules. 
•  Should distinctions be drawn between different categories of public expenditure? It has been 
variously argued that public infrastructure investment, or education, or defence spending 
should not be limited by the rules in the Stability and Growth Pact of the euro area. In the two 
CFA franc zones, the fiscal deficit measure selected excludes grants and foreign-financed 
public investment expenditure. This is to avoid grant revenues, which tend to be outside the 
control of the host country and may be temporary, leading to an unduly rosy picture of the 
deficit, and because these grants are often linked to particular social or infrastructure 
spending. 
Given the inevitability of doubts about any specific fiscal rules, very rigid enforcement may not prove 
practicable. Yet limits of some kind are probably needed if an RCA is to be credible with the markets. 
Enforcing such limits is likely to present a delicate political challenge. The European Union has gone 
furthest in establishing sanctions on governments that do not respect the ceiling on fiscal deficits: see 
Von Hagen and Mundschenk (2002). The Stability and Growth Pact allows for a gradation of sanctions 
leading to the imposition of fines on governments for excessive deficits. How far these provisions 
would “bite” if a major country were significantly to overshoot the targets remains to be seen. 
Sanctions in the CFA franc zones have yet to be applied, but could include denial of access to 
financing by the central bank or regional development bank. It may in any case be difficult ex post to 
enforce monetary sanctions that in principle were agreed ex ante, because it would be politically 
unpalatable to make countries already facing fiscal deficits pay large fines. More credible might be the 
suspension of participation in the decision-making bodies of the RCA: see Masson and Pattillo (2002). 
The operation of modern day currency boards 
With a currency board, all currency is automatically guaranteed to be fully backed by a reserve 
currency at a fixed rate and the monetary authorities are obliged to redeem their liabilities at this rate. 
The potential for arbitrage generally limits any divergence from this rate in transactions throughout the 
economy. Such full backing should remove any incentive for a “run” from the currency. If the bulk of 
transactions balances are held with banks, however, a simple focus on currency is less relevant.  
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Table 6  
Convergence criteria in regional currency areas 
Fiscal criteria (% to GDP) 
 Inflation 
Deficit Debt  Govt 
revenue 
Other 
Current RCAs           
Euro area  entry  <1.5% 
above 
lowest 3 
<3%    <60%    Participation in ERM II without tension for 
at least two years. Long-term bond yields 
within 2% of the average of those in the 
three economies with lowest inflation 
 ongoing     <3%
1      
West Africa 
(WAEMU) 
<3%   0
2    <70%    >17%  No payment arrears, current account 
deficit <3% of GDP; public wage bill no 
more than 35% of revenues 
Central Africa 
(CAEMC) 
<3%   0
2    <70%    >17%  No payment arrears, current account 
deficit <3% of GDP; public wage bill no 
more than 35% of revenues 
Proposed RCAs           
West Africa 
(ECOWAS) 
<5%    <4%      Reserves > 6 months’ imports, no 
payment arrears, central bank financing 








   
Andean 
Community 
<10%   <4%    <50%    
Caribbean 
(CARICOM) 
        Steady exchange rate for 3 years, foreign 
reserves> 3 months’ imports, external 
debt service/ exports <15% 
1  With structural component in balance.   
2  Excluding grants and externally financed investment.   
3  See page 149 of this 
volume for a full list of secondary criteria. 
 
Currency boards were very common in colonial administrations, but became less popular after World 
War II. Many newly independent countries were keen to have central banks and independent 
currencies to symbolise their nationhood in the same way as a flag or a seat at the UN. It also 
reflected a prevailing view that currency boards inhibited national development by directing savings 
abroad and preventing “fine-tuning” of macroeconomic policies. Some governments hoped central 
banks could provide “cheaper” means of funding expenditure, or a less politically visible means than 
taxation. The paper by Ojo in this volume cites “the scarcity of foreign exchange, the need to finance 
priority projects and make room for some growth” as reasons why the proposed second monetary 
zone in western African has eschewed a currency board. 
Currency boards had a revival in the 1990s as having a stable monetary anchor became regarded as 
more important than being able to use monetary policy for counter cyclical policy. Currency boards 
were viewed as a good way of obtaining stability in some transition economies with little experience of 
central banking and little confidence in institutions: the paper by Kovačević in this volume, for example, 
refers to the triple transition Bosnia and Herzegovina were facing; from war to peace, from command-
economy to free market and from province to independent country. There has been discussion about 
introducing currency boards in eastern Europe, Iraq, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, 
Palestine and Somalia, and they had been considered in Ecuador, El Salvador and East Timor before 
it was decided to adopt the US dollar. Some writers have even recommended the system for large 
economies such as Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Ukraine.  





























Bahamas 1916  US  dollar    314    5      24  CB   
Bermuda 1915  US  dollar    60    2      11
3 MA   
Bosnia & Herzegovina  1997  Euro
4   4,121    24 
   41  CB  Yes 
Brunei 1967  Singapore  $    351    7      31  CyB  No 
Bulgaria 1997  Euro
4   7,868    54    60    46  CB  Yes 
Cayman Islands  1972  US dollar    35    <1      MA  Yes 
Djibouti 1949  US  dollar    657    1      3
3  CB  
Eastern Caribbean  1950  US dollar    585    4    69    39
3 CB   
Estonia 1992  Euro
4   1,358    15    95    42  CB   
Faroe Islands  1949  Danish krone   50    1     49
3 ComB   
Falkland Islands   1899  UK pound    3    <1      Govt   
Gibraltar 1927  UK  pound    28    <1      Govt  No 
Guernsey 1945  UK  pound    65    1      Govt  No 
Hong Kong  1983  US dollar    6,773   182    141    6  3ComB  Yes 
Isle of Man  1961  UK pound    80    2      Govt  No 
Jersey 1963  UK  pound    90    2      Govt  No 
Lesotho  1980  S African rand    2,087    6    106    80
3 CB No 
Lithuania 1994  Euro
5   3,476    34    59    44  CB   
Macau 1983  Hong Kong $    443   8    60   17  2ComB   
Namibia  1993  S African rand    1,823    12    53
3   81
3 CB No 
St Helena  1917  UK pound    7    <1      Govt   
Note: CB = central bank, CyB = currency board, MA = monetary authority, ComB = commercial bank(s). 
1  2002.   
2    Purchasing power basis.     
3  2000  or  2001.   
4    Prior to the creation of the euro, the Deutsche mark was the 
anchor currency.   
5  Prior to February 2002, the US dollar was the anchor currency. 
Sources: Hawkins (2003b); IMF; World Bank. 
 
Under a broad definition encompassing both orthodox currency boards and what writers such as 
Schuler (1999) have termed “currency board-like” systems, there are about 20 currency boards in 
operation today (see Table 7). Many of these are like the traditional colonial currency boards, 
operating in very small economies with limited financial systems (eg Faroe Islands, St Helena). They 
are essentially of only numismatic interest (like the fully backed banknotes issued by some Scottish 
and Northern Irish banks). The more interesting examples are the “modern day currency boards” 
operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hong Kong SAR and Lithuania, and formerly 
in Argentina. Currency boards mostly operate in small open economies; only Hong Kong SAR has a 
gross national income exceeding USD 100 billion. 
A risk related to the operation of currency boards is complacency about currency mismatches: see 
Goldstein and Turner (2003). In particular, it is hard for authorities pledging to uphold a fixed exchange 
rate simultaneously to tell banks not to be exposed to the risk of its abandonment. The Argentine 
debacle stands as a clear warning about this. Both the private and the public sectors in that country 
built up massive foreign currency denominated debt, but did not have the ability to generate foreign  
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currency earnings to service such debts. No monetary arrangement can or should disguise prudential 
mismatches of that kind. 
Extent of backing 
A classical currency board has 100% backing for currency. In a modern day currency board the 
backing rule is often extended to cover all monetary liabilities (the monetary base). This is very 
different from the position in major economies where reserves are equivalent to half or less of the 
currency issue (see Table B1 in Annex B).  
A currency board cannot and does not guarantee that the broad money supply (which includes 
currency and all bank deposits) is matched by foreign reserves. If the banking system were required to 
do this it could not make any loans. Nevertheless, foreign currency liquidity safeguards must be built 
into the banking system to ensure the payment system continues to operate even in the face of a run 
on bank deposits. This is why the Argentine “convertibility plan” imposed quite demanding 
requirements on banks (Table 8), such as requiring them to maintain deposits with foreign banks held 
abroad. The watering down of these prudential measures (for example allowing banks to deposit a 
smaller fraction of reserves abroad and to use government bonds to satisfy the requirement) in early 
2001 undermined the credibility of the whole system. In the end, bank deposits were frozen and the 
payment system ceased to function.  
 
Table 8 
Some characteristics of modern-day currency boards 





currency  Euro  Euro  Euro US  dollar Euro US  dollar 
Inception  1997 1997 1992 1983 1994 1991 








Reserve ratio  10-15%  8%  3% & 10%  None  8%  20% 
Base  All liabilities  All deposits  Wide range    Deposits  
<1 year 
All deposits 
Maintenance  10 days  1 month  1 month    1 month  1 month 
Remunerated Yes No  Yes    No  Yes 
Lender of last 
resort  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1  Insofar as the requirement could be met with assets held abroad. 
Source: Ho (2002). 
 
Currency boards and central banking 
Some purists, such as Friedman (1993), Hanke (2002) and Schwartz (1992), argue that currency 
boards should have no liabilities other than the currency, hold no domestic currency assets and take 
on no “central banking” functions. In practice, some currency boards impose reserve requirements on 
banks (Table 8) and others accept other deposits from them. Engaging in these sorts of operations 
and providing some limited lender of last resort facilities are not inconsistent with a currency board so 
long as the full backing of the currency is not brought into question (ie so long as loans only involve 
“excess” reserves and do not lead to any discretionary expansion of the monetary base without foreign 
currency backing). 
Historically, many currency boards operated in rudimentary colonial economies where domestic 
banking was little developed and capital flows small. Under these circumstances, there was a very  
BIS Papers No 17   21
 
close relationship between the trade balance and monetary expansion. The transmission mechanism 
should have been like the classic Hume price-specie flow. If prices in the domestic economy started to 
rise faster, this would lead to a loss of competitiveness, exports would slow, reducing reserves and the 
money supply, dampening activity and reversing the initial price rise. All this should have happened 
without any policy action.  
This simple result carries over to more sophisticated financial systems only under restrictive 
assumptions. In modern economies, there is not a one-to-one correspondence between international 
reserves and either currency or base money (although it is higher than in other economies); see 
Table B2 in Annex B. One reason is that currency boards may hold excess reserves as an “investment 
portfolio” in addition to those backing the currency. The relationship of reserves with broad money is 
weaker still.  
Traditional forms of currency board did not involve an interbank money market. In the Falkland 
Islands, there is only one bank. In many British colonies the banks present were all branches of British 
banks that could settle between themselves in London. Modern day currency boards operate in 
sophisticated financial markets where the authorities are concerned about excess volatility in financial 
markets. Allowing volatile capital flows to automatically affect domestic money markets could result in 
very volatile interest rates. This is one reason why modern day currency boards may conduct some 
form of open market transactions. In Hong Kong SAR short-term interest rate volatility is now 
comparable to that in non-currency board economies, but in Estonia and Lithuania it is significantly 
higher, as it previously was in Argentina (Table B3). In some cases these relationships have changed 
over time. For example, the September 1998 reforms in Hong Kong,
15 designed to make their system 
less susceptible to capital outflows, especially speculative outflows (see HKMA (1998) and Yue 
(2001)), appear to have reduced volatility in short-term interest rates. In Argentina, a series of changes 
and foreshadowed changes, and the issue of pseudo-currencies by provincial governments, during 
2001 were associated with both a marked reduction in the correlation between reserves and currency 
and an increase in volatility in financial markets (Tables B2 and B3). 
Use of foreign currencies 
Use of a foreign currency is probably a natural reaction in a small country closely linked through trade 
and finance to a large neighbour - be it the dollar, euro or the South African rand. Table 9 provides a 
list and some economic data; see www.dollarization.org for many references to the literature. The 
controversial policy issues, however, concern different situations. The first is whether large countries 
with a record of deficient monetary policy should embrace a foreign currency. The second is the 
converse: should countries faced with substantial unofficial use of foreign currency seek to reverse 
that situation? 
Use of foreign currency as a policy choice 
Use of a foreign currency appears attractive because it creates a stable measure of value to govern 
trade and finance and reduces transactions costs. However, it deprives the country of the main 
monetary policy weapon to deal with recession.
16 Unless there are capital controls, interest rates have 
to follow those in the anchor currency regardless of whether the using country is facing the same 
economic conditions. The authorities cannot stimulate domestic demand and improve competitiveness 
by a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. The only alternative is lower domestic costs and 
prices. This can only work if the domestic economy is sufficiently flexible. Hong Kong perhaps enjoys 
such flexibility; many other economies do not. Apart from loss of seigniorage, the main economic 
difference from a currency board is that adoption of a foreign currency is much harder to reverse. This 
may have credibility benefits but if the initial conversion rate turns out to be have been inappropriate, 
the economy will suffer. One benefit over a currency board is that currency mismatches are 
eliminated: see Goldstein and Turner (2003). 
                                                       
15  In particular, the introduction of a discount window assuring availability of end-day liquidity. 
16  Changing required reserve ratios and quantitative controls remain as potential means of affecting interest rates and credit.  
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Table 9 











‘000 (2002)  Comment 
Andorra Euro
2  1278    1    70  President of France and the bishop of 
Urgel (Spain) are heads of state 
Belarus  Russian rouble  Due 2004    53    9,931   
Cook Islands  NZ dollar  1965    <1    14  Since independence in 1965, has 
been in free association with New 
Zealand; own coins 
East Timor  US dollar  2002    2    753   
Ecuador US  dollar  2000    41    13,112   
El Salvador  US dollar  2001    30    6,524   
Greenland Danish  krone Before 
1800 
 1    60  Self-governing 
Guatemala  US dollar  2001    47    11,992  US dollar made legal tender but 
domestic currency also circulates 
Kiribati  Australian dollar  1979    <1    95  Own coins circulate 
Kosovo  Euro  2001    4    1,800  Part of former Yugoslavia 
Lesotho Rand  1974    6    2,087   
Liechtenstein Swiss  franc  1921    1   30  
Marshall 
Islands 
US dollar  1979    <1    53  Since 1986 in free association with 
US 
Micronesia  US dollar  1986    <1    122  Prior to independence, UN trust 
territory under US administration  
Monaco Euro
3 1865    <1    30   
Montenegro  Euro  1999    2    620  Part of former Yugoslavia 
Namibia Rand  1992    12    1,823   
Nauru  Australian dollar  1968    <1    12  UN trust territory administered by 
Australia before independence 




Turkish lira  1975    1    200   
Palau  US dollar  1981    <1    20  In free association with the United 
States, who had administered UN 
trust territory prior to independence 
Panama  US dollar  1904    17    2,940  Own coins circulate 
San Marino  Euro
4  1897    <1    30  Own coins circulate 
Swaziland Rand 1974    5    1,088   
Tuvalu Australian  dollar  1978    <1    11   
Vatican City  Euro
4  1929    <1    1  Own coins circulate 
1  In purchasing power terms; billions of US dollars.   
2  Prior to the creation of the euro, both the French franc and Spanish 
peseta were legal tender.   
3  Prior to the creation of the euro, the French franc was legal tender.   
4  Prior to the creation of 
the euro, the Italian lira was legal tender. 
Main sources: Edwards and Magendzo (2002); Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002); Schuler (2000); IMF, International 
Financial Statistics, Direction of Trade Statistics; World Bank; SBS World Guide, 10th edition, 2002.  
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One particular problem with forgoing an independent currency would arise if the national central bank, 
unable to print money, were no longer able to provide an unlimited lender of last resort facility in the 
classic Bagehot (1873) sense. Insurance (public or private) could assist banks hit by bank-specific 
problems in an economy using another currency. But systemic shocks would be harder to handle 
because all banks would be affected at the same time. Limited emergency liquidity assistance could 
be provided by easing reserve requirements in times of stress, thus providing banks with liquidity. Use 
of excess foreign reserves or direct budgetary payments by governments may also be possible. 
Some see virtue in the absence of a lender of last resort, arguing it would force private sector banks to 
be more prudent. In the case of banking systems dominated by international banks, the responsibility 
of providing emergency liquidity assistance would lie with the parent bank.
17 Moreover, it could be 
argued that authorities with no scope for independent monetary policy action will be more careful in 
the design of prudential policies to ensure the health of the banking system. Yue (2001) argues that 
such policies also tend to contribute to macroeconomic stabilisation.  
Econometric studies have been mixed. While it seems that countries adopting a foreign currency have 
had lower inflation than those with their own currency, it is not clear whether fiscal policy has been 
more disciplined or whether economic growth has been faster or slower: see for example Schuler 
(1996) and Edwards and Magendzo (2003a,b). Panama, which has long used the US dollar, is the 
only independent Latin American country to offer long-term fixed rate mortgages, but interest rates 
there are higher than in Chile, which has a floating exchange rate. 
Unofficial use of foreign currency 
Citizens in some emerging economies make extensive domestic use of foreign currencies (see 
Table 10). There may be some advantages from this: in economies where citizens lack confidence in 
the domestic currency, economic activity is helped by the use of foreign currency. Hayek (1976) 
argued that, as with other products, competition between currencies improves their quality, a line of 
argument that was espoused by the UK government in discussions on a European currency in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Attempts to prohibit the use of foreign currency may do more harm than good. 
Nevertheless, there may be several complications for the operation of monetary policy. 
Econometric studies show that macroeconomic performance tends to be worse in countries with 
extensive unofficial use of foreign currency.
18 For instance, De Nicoló et al (2003) and 
Gomis-Porqueras et al (2000) conclude that countries with a high unofficial use of foreign currency 
tend to experience greater macroeconomic volatility and are more prone to financial instability. But this 
is not necessarily causal as generally foreign currencies are more widely used in countries that are 
poorly managed in general. Similarly, exchange rate pass-through is significantly higher in those 
emerging economies with high unofficial use of foreign currencies (specifically as bank deposits); see 
Honohan and Shi (2002). But the high pass-through may be due to the history of high inflation in these 
countries (see Table 10). A further problem is that exchange rate depreciation could itself lead to a 
further fall in use of the domestic currency: see Kraft (2002) for some empirical work on this for 
Croatia. 
Nevertheless, monetary control is likely to be weaker in economies where there is substantial use of 
foreign currency. Central banks can generally control interest rates on interbank transactions in the 
local currency, which are a major influence on interest rates charged by banks on loans in domestic 
currency. But the interest rates charged by banks on loans denominated in foreign currency depend in 
principle on foreign interest rates.  
But there is still scope for the central bank to drive a wedge between foreign currency interest rates in 
the domestic market and those prevailing internationally. For instance, some countries use reserve 
requirements on foreign currency deposits and the interest rate paid on these reserves as 
supplementary instruments where necessary to support monetary policy. 
                                                       
17   How far such responsibility would extend in practice is an open question. Losses in Argentina, for instance, were larger than 
foreign banks’ direct equity participations in Argentina. The decision on whether to pump in additional funds depends on 
foreign banks’ perceptions about their prospects in that jurisdiction. 
18  Arteta (2003) however finds little evidence that these countries are more likely to have banking or currency crises, or that 
























Some economies with widespread unofficial use of foreign currencies 
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country whose 






Albania  Euro, US dollar    13    22    32    2    49    74    24 
Argentina  US  dollar   377  5    74
4   90    12    12    7 
Bolivia  US  dollar  20  5    91    9   27    13    8 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina Euro    24    16    55    21    81    41    2 
Bulgaria Euro    54    10    57
4   8    60    46    101 
Cambodia  USD, Thai baht    20    6    94    9    56    30
3   5 
Colombia  US  dollar   257  5  Prohibited   29   21    32    20 
Croatia  Euro   43  5
4   71
4   8    55    52    72 
Laos  Thai  baht   9  1    83
4   5    32
4   59
1   30 
Latvia US  dollar    21    11    44
4   9    56   2    25 
Lesotho  S African rand    6    2      13    106    80
1   9 
Macau  HK  dollar   8  4    52
1   8    61    17    4 
Macedonia  Euro   13  7    65
4   12    56
2   44    8 
Nepal Indian  rupee    33    13      3   29    33
1   8 
Nicaragua  US  dollar  13  6
4   71
4   41
4   78
4   25   35 
Paraguay  US  dollar  25  5
4   67
4   40    38
4   18   13 
Peru  US  dollar   128  3    66
4   17    17    26    24 
Romania  Euro    141  3    51    6   41    59    93 
Russia  US  dollar   1,127  7    54    17   24    6    86 
Turkey  US  dollar   426  2
4   58
4   13
4   30
4   7   78 
Ukraine US  dollar    227    13    33    11   52
2   1    200 
Uruguay  US  dollar  41  3
4   85
4   65    20   8    30 
Venezuela  US  dollar   127  3
4 Prohibited    209    17    28    46 
1  2000.   
2  1999.    
3  Thailand; US accounts for only 2%.   
4  2001. 
Main sources: Arteta (2003); Baliño et al (1999); De Nicoló et al (2003); Kovanen (2002); Padoa-Schioppa (2002); IMF, International Financial Statistics, June 2003, Direction of Trade Statistics; 
World Bank; BIS. 
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Successful macroeconomic stabilisation can be expected to lead to a decline in the unofficial use of 
foreign currencies. But this process takes time, as regaining credibility may be protracted. Peru’s 
hyperinflation was brought under control following reforms in 1990 and inflation has been held under 
15% since 1995 and under 5% since 1999. Yet half of bank deposits are still denominated in foreign 
currency. Indeed, there may be “network effects” such that once societies adapt to using a foreign 
currency, they may not switch back at all.
19 
Some countries try to encourage use of domestic currency deposits by levying lower reserve 
requirements on them, which may be passed on to depositors in the form of more attractive interest 
rates. Some countries, such as Canada, Czech Republic, Korea, Nigeria, Poland and Switzerland, 
exclude foreign currency deposits from the coverage of their deposit insurance schemes. Bolivia, 
Brazil, Israel and Nigeria have allowed banks to offer dollar-indexed deposits and Brazil inflation-
indexed deposits, both of which may be attractive alternatives to foreign currency deposits (the danger 
with dollar-indexed debt of course is that such debt can become too large to service if the exchange 
rate collapses in a crisis). In Egypt, liberalising restrictions on domestic interest rates led to a marked 
fall in the proportion of foreign currency deposits. More direct attempts to prevent the use of foreign 
currencies (such as the steep fines or even gaol terms Ukraine imposed for domestic use of 
US dollars in 1996) are likely to drive depositors offshore. Permitting foreign currency deposits may 
allow domestic banks to retain deposits when some depositors lose confidence in the domestic 
currency and allow banks to more easily match foreign currency loans. Forced conversions into 
domestic currency (particularly if at an artificial exchange rate) are also likely to damage confidence in 
the domestic financial system. This was the experience of Bolivia and Mexico in 1982 and Peru in 
1985. 
4. Conclusion 
Increasing capital mobility and weak financial systems have caused many emerging market countries 
to search for regimes that deliver both exchange rate stability and relatively immunity to speculative 
attack. Prominent candidates are regional currency arrangements, currency boards, and the unilateral 
adoption of a foreign currency. In addition, the informal use of a foreign currency may have some of 
the same implications, namely by limiting the possibility to use domestic monetary policy effectively. 
These regimes differ in several respects. Regional currency areas are often associated with broader 
political objectives, rather than purely economic ones, though some estimates suggest that sharing a 
common currency can give a large boost to trade and output. The use of convergence criteria as 
qualifications for entry and on an ongoing basis is justified in part by the concern that political will 
needs to be demonstrated. Convergence criteria also serve the purpose of preventing fiscal policy 
from interfering with the conduct and credibility of monetary policy. 
The unilateral adoption of a foreign currency, or its close cousin, the currency board, has the 
advantage of producing an immediate gain in credibility from the use of an established, and 
presumably stable, currency. The cost is the loss in flexibility that results, since it is likely to mean loss 
of influence over monetary policy. Currency boards are themselves not immune from crisis, which 
explains the interest in outright adoption of a foreign currency, despite the associated loss of 
seigniorage. 
                                                       
19   See Feige et al (2000), Gomis-Porqueras et al (2000), Temprano Arroyo (2002), for the Croatian experience Kraft (2002) 
and for the Russian experience Oomes (2003).   
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Annex A: 
Regional currency areas 
Some examples of where three or more independent countries use or used a common currency are:  
European Monetary Union (1999- ): Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece (joined in 
2001), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain adopted a single currency, the 
euro, in 1999, although euro notes and coins were only introduced in 2002. See the paper by 
Strauss-Kahn in this volume. 
Eastern Caribbean Currency Area (1950- ): Anguilla (UK territory, joined 1987), Antigua & Barbuda, 
Dominica, Grenada (joined 1968), Montserrat (UK territory), St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia and St Vincent 
& the Grenadines. Some former members left the area to establish their own currencies; Trinidad & 
Tobago in 1962, Guyana in 1965 and Barbados in 1972. The Eastern Caribbean dollar is pegged to 
the US dollar (prior to 1976 it had been pegged to sterling), but the United States is not a party to the 
agreement. The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) was established in 1983 to replace the 
Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority, which in turn had been the successor to the British Caribbean 
Currency Board. The ECCB operates as a quasi-central bank, but retains some currency board 
features; it maintains a minimum foreign exchange cover of 60% (70% before 1975 and 100% before 
1965), although in practice the cover has usually exceeded 95%. The ECCA economies are all small, 
with a combined population of about half a million. See van Beek et al (2000) and Hendrickson et al 
(2002) for further information. 
Central African Economic and Monetary Community, CAEMC (1945- ): Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea (joined 1985) and Gabon. Their common 
central bank is the Bank of the States of Central Africa and the common currency is the franc de la 
coopération financière en Afrique centrale. Originally created as a colonial currency in 1945, it was 
retained after independence. It has been pegged to the French franc, and now the euro, throughout 
this period, but was devalued by half in 1994. At least 65% of central bank reserves are held with the 
French treasury, which guarantees its convertibility into euros. Equatorial Guinea is the only member 
that is not a former French colony.  
West African Economic and Monetary Union, WAEMU (1945- ): Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Guinea-Bissau (joined in 1997), Mali (left in 1962 but rejoined in 1984), Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
(São Tomé & Príncipe may be joining soon.) Their common central bank is the Central Bank of West 
African States and their common currency is the  franc de la communauté financière d’Afrique. 
Originally created as a colonial currency in 1945, it was retained after independence. At least 65% of 
central bank reserves are held with the French treasury, which guarantees its convertibility into euros. 
It has been pegged to the French franc, and now the euro, for this period, but was devalued by half in 
1994. Both the central African and west African currencies are commonly called the “CFA franc” but 
are not legal tender in the other region, In theory they could have different values but in practice they 
have always been the same. See Banny (2002) for further information. 
East African Currency Board (1963-72): Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda operated a joint currency 
board after they gained their independence in 1961-63, essentially continuing colonial currency 
arrangements that had been in place since 1919. Gradually it was allowed to operate more like a 
central bank and in time it fell apart. By 1977 all three countries had exchange controls relating to 
each other’s currencies. See Cohen (1998, p73) for more information. 
Latin Monetary Union (1865-1914): Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Greece (joined in 1868), Italy and 
Switzerland formed a monetary union, initially for a 15-year period, but subsequently renewed.
20 It 
provided for the circulation of gold and silver coins (at a fixed parity) throughout the union by all 
members, identical in size and weight but with national designs, and acceptable as legal tender. The 
union ended with World War I. See Bordo and Jonung (1999), de Cecco (1992), Einaudi (2002) and 
                                                       
20   In 1865, France proposed extending the union to include Britain and the United States, which would likely have ended up 
with most of the world as members. Despite some enthusiasm at a conference, the idea faded for lack of sustained political 
support. See Cohen (1998, pp 69-70).  
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Henriksen and Kærgård (1995) for further discussion. Flandreau and Maurel (2001) are sceptical on 
whether this union added anything to the gold standard arrangements. 
Scandinavian Currency Union (1873-1913): Denmark, Norway (joined in 1875) and Sweden formed 
a monetary union when they adopted the gold standard (but note that the latter two were also in a 
political union until 1905) and a common unit, the krona. But they continued to issue their own notes 
and coins. At the outbreak of World War I they all abandoned both the gold standard and the currency 
union. See Bergman (1999) and de Vanessy (2003) for further information. 
German and Austro-Prussian Monetary Unions (1838-67): Baden, Bavaria, Frankfurt, Hesse, 
Nassau Saxe-Meiningen (joined later), Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt (joined later) and Württemberg 
agreed on a monetary union with the northern states adopting the thaler and the southern states the 
florin with a fixed rate of exchange. All states agreed to issue silver coins in proportion to their 
population which were legal tender throughout the union. The 1857 treaty between Austria and the 
German member states fixed the exchange rate between the Austrian currency and the German 
currencies and members agreed to withdraw non-convertible notes. After the Battle of Sadowa, 
Bismarck issued a decree dissolving the union and its formal dissolution occurred through a treaty 
signed in 1867. See de Cecco (1992) and de Vanessy (2003) for more details. 
Earlier monetary unions (1379-1814): Monetary unions such as the Hanseatic Monetary League and 
the Monetary Federation of the Rhine were negotiated when money was essentially coinage and its 
value was determined by the value of its gold or silver content. The monetary unions largely consisted 
of standardising the coins. See Einaudi (2002). There was a long-running monetary union involving 
paper currency until around 1750 between Connecticut, Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire and 
Rhode Island; see Graboyes (1990). 
Proposed regional currency areas 
There are a number of proposed future RCAs. Some are now the declared aim of governments while 
others are academic conjectures. The following are those most discussed, and the subject of Table 5. 
Greater Europe: Many eastern European countries are keen to join the European Union and the euro 
area. There are 13 official applicant countries; Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey. Ten of these are 
likely to join the EU in 2004 and will then be expected to participate in the ERM II for at least two years 
in order to achieve convergence criteria before joining the euro area. 
There are also discussions about a regional currency for Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine by 
2011; see Marchenko (2003). 
Africa: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which includes the eight 
members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (see above) plus The Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, declared their intention to form a broader monetary union 
by signing the Accra Declaration in April 2000. This had been stated as a goal of ECOWAS since its 
formation in 1975 and is intended to accompany a broader integration process. It has gained impetus 
since the election of a more sympathetic government in Nigeria, the largest of the ECOWAS 
economies. The first step was to have been monetary union among five non-WAEMU countries 
(Liberia is not participating) by January 2003 and to this end they pledged to limit fiscal deficits and 
co-ordinate macroeconomic policies. A West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) was established in 
2000 as a precursor to a regional central bank. The current plan is for a monetary union of all the 
ECOWAS countries in 2004. See the papers by Ebi and Ojo in this volume, Addison (2002), Asante 
and Masson (2001), Debrun et al (2002), Masson and Pattillo (2001, 2003) and Ukpong (2002) for 
further discussion.  
In 1999 Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda signed a treaty forming an economic bloc and laying grounds 
for a monetary union, which would be essentially reviving their former currency union. See Guillaume 
and Stasavage (2000) and Mkenda (2001). 
Alesina et al (2002) report that 11 members of the Southern African Development Community are 
debating whether to form a monetary union, possibly centred on the rand. See also the paper by van 
Zyl in this volume.  
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The African Union (successor to the Organisation of African Unity) has recently reaffirmed the aim of a 
common African currency, perhaps by 2021, although there appear to be few tangible steps taken 
towards implementing it; see the paper by Ojo in this volume, Masson and Pattillo (2003) and 
Ogunkola (2002). 
Arabian Gulf: The Gulf Cooperation Council, comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates was founded in 1981 and one of its initial goals was to move towards a 
common currency. The successful launch of the euro invigorated these aspirations and the Council 
announced in early 2002 a customs union by 2003 (brought forward from 2005) and a plan for a 
common currency by 2010. A new currency, possibly to be called the Gulf dinar, will be established. 
As an interim step, all member currencies are pegged to the US dollar. A committee of central bank 
governors, and a technical committee of central bankers, is working on the project. Oil or related 
products account for 70-80% of revenue in all of the countries. See the papers by Al-Bassam, Al 
Falasi, Al-Jasser and Al-Hamidy, and Al-Thani in this volume, Abed et al (2003), Fasano and Iqbal 
(2002), Jadresic (2002) and Laabas and Limam (2002) for further information. 
Latin America: The Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, with Bolivia and Chile 
as associate members). In 1997, Argentina’s then president Carlos Menem proposed such a currency 
union in the indefinite future. At their presidential summit in 2002, the idea of a “Monetary Institute of 
Mercosur” as an embryonic central bank was informally discussed. With Argentina and Brazil having 
been forced off their exchange rate pegs in the last couple of years, the idea may gain more support. 
See Eichengreen (1998) and Fratianni and Hauskrecht (2002) for academic support for the idea that 
an RCA would support the push for deeper integration within Mercosur, Ferrari-Filho (2002) for a 
critique and Belke and Gros (2002) for a further discussion.  
The Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) signed an agreement in 
1969 calling for “harmonisation of exchange rate, monetary, financial and fiscal policies”, and set some 
convergence criteria (see Table 6) but no firm plans for establishing an RCA. See Scandizzo (2002) 
and Temprano Arroyo (2002). 
The Central American Common Market countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua) have as a medium-term goal a monetary union, but some members have recently adopted 
the US dollar. 
Caribbean:  CARICOM agreed in 1992 that its eight members which are currently not part of the 
ECCB area (Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago) 
should join it to form a Caribbean-wide single currency, but it has not been implemented. See Worrell 
(2003). 
North America: Canada, Mexico and the United States are members of the trade group NAFTA. 
Given the high proportion of Canada and Mexico’s trade with the United States, a NAFTA dollar or 
“Amero” has been proposed by some Canadian academics such as Grubel (1999). See also Beine 
and Coulombe (2002) and Robson and Laidler (2002). 
Asia:  In December 1998, ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) leaders endorsed a project to study the feasibility of a 
common ASEAN currency and a task force of central bank officials led by Bank Negara Malaysia was 
established in August 2000; see the note by Ooi and Singh in this volume. The head of the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority raised the possibility of a wider common Asian currency in Yam (1999), albeit in 
the distant future. The idea has also been discussed by academics such as Kim and Ryou (2001) and 
Mundell (2003) and in a paper commissioned from Bayoumi and Mauro (1999). One factor favouring 
an RCA in Asia is that the countries have diversified trading partners so there is no obvious candidate 
currency to which to link. Kang and Wang (2002) provide a recent overview. 
South Pacific: Hargreaves and McDermott (1999), Brash (2000), Grimes and Holmes (2000) and 
Coleman (2001) provide a discussion of suggestions for Australia and New Zealand to adopt an 
“Anzac dollar”. The latter studies note that half the New Zealand public and the majority of 
NZ business leaders support a monetary union. New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark regards the 
idea as worth considering. However, given that the Australian economy is seven times as large as that 
of New Zealand, it may be more realistic to think in terms of New Zealand adopting the Australian 
dollar. The topic of a currency union is little discussed in Australia and the advantages there would 
probably not outweigh the costs of introducing a new currency. The five small Pacific nations currently 
using either the Australian or NZ dollars could also join, as could Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, for whom Australia is the largest trading partner.  
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Table A1 











as % of 
GDP (2002) 
% of imports 
from (exports to) 
fellow members 
(2002) 
Anguilla   12    <1  EC  dollar     
Antigua & Barbuda    69    1  EC dollar    86
1  
Austria   8,141    230  Euro    52    63  (55) 
Belgium   10,320    282  Euro    82
2  61  (61) 
Benin    6,603    7  CFA franc (W)    36
2   6  (7) 
Burkina Faso    11,831    12  CFA franc (W)    26    29 (6) 
Cameroon    15,523    25  CFA franc (C)    20
3   2  (4) 
Central African Republic    3,828    5  CFA franc (C)    11
2   8  (2) 
Chad    8,144    8  CFA franc (C)    42
2   3  (4) 
Congo, Republic    3,190    2  CFA franc (C)    50    5 (0) 
Côte d’Ivoire    16,775    24  CFA franc (W)    35
2   1  (13) 
Dominica   72    <1  EC  dollar    66
1   4  (17) 
1 
Equatorial Guinea    481    3  CFA franc (C)    21
1   3  (2) 
Finland   5,199    132  Euro    30    33  (33) 
France   59,442    1,556  Euro    25    56  (49) 
Gabon    1,291    7  CFA franc (C)    50
4   2  (0) 
Germany   82,495    2,163  Euro    32    43  (43) 
Greece   10,631    194  Euro    27    46  (30) 
Grenada   102    1  EC  dollar    85
1   2  (15) 
Guinea-Bissau    1,253    1  CFA franc (W)    31
2   15  (1) 
Ireland   3,878    109  Euro    73    20  (38) 
Italy   57,919    1,467  Euro    26    50  (45) 
Luxembourg   444    23  Euro    128    74  (73) 
Mali    11,346    10  CFA franc (W)    39
2   22  (3) 
Montserrat   8    <1  EC  dollar     
Netherlands   16,144    443  Euro    60    42  (63) 
Niger    11,542    9  CFA franc (W)    24
2   22  (4) 
Portugal   10,032    174  Euro    38    70  (67) 
St Kitts & Nevis    46    <1  EC dollar    71
2   3  (2) 
St Lucia    159    1  EC dollar    58
2   2  (7) 
St Vincent & Grenadines    117    1  EC dollar    66
2   1  (5) 
Sénégal    10,007    15  CFA franc (W)    38
2   4  (14) 
Spain   41,180    843  Euro    30    57  (59) 
Togo    4,767    7  CFA franc (W)    50
2   4  (27) 
Note: (W) West African Economic and Monetary Union; (C) Central African Economic and Monetary Community. 
1  2000.   
2  2001.   
3  1999.   
4  1998. 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, June 2003, Direction of Trade Statistics; World Bank.  
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Applied literature on optimum currency areas (OCAs) 
Goodhart’s (1995) much-cited comment that “the theory of optimum currency areas has relatively little 
predictive power. Virtually all independent sovereign states have separate currencies, and changes in 
sovereign status lead rapidly to accompanying adjustments in monetary autonomy” has not deterred a 
large number of economists from assessing which economies form OCAs. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) used a structural vector autoregression approach and concluded 
that there were three plausible sets of candidates for monetary unification. One was in Europe 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and perhaps Switzerland), one in 
northeast Asia (Japan, Korea and Taiwan) and one in southeast Asia (Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore and possibly Thailand), but none in the Americas. 
A study using similar techniques reported in Alesina and Barro (2001) concludes “there seems to be a 
fairly clear dollar area involving Canada, Mexico, most of Central America, and parts of 
South  America. The Philippines, Hong Kong and Singapore also belong [to the dollar zone]. The 
euro area includes all of Western Europe and most of Africa. There does not seem to be a yen area 
beyond Japan, except perhaps for Indonesia”. 
Europe 
A number of studies find that western Europe does not meet the OCA criteria as closely as do the 
US states or groups of states; see for example UK Treasury (2003b). This is particularly true for labour 
mobility, unsurprisingly given that the United States has (more or less) a single language. Studies 
such as Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) also show that shocks are more highly correlated within the 
United States. However, a more disaggregated study by Bayoumi and Prasad (1995) suggests that 
the relative importance of aggregate, industry-specific and region-specific shocks is similar in the 
United States and Europe. 
Masson (1999) suggests central European countries’ industrial structure does not imply obvious 
problems of asymmetric shocks in forming a currency union with western Europe. Fidrmuc and 
Korhonen (2001) conclude that Estonia, Hungary and Latvia have faced supply shocks similar to those 
of the euro area and Estonia, Hungary and Poland similar demand shocks. It is likely that the shocks 
are becoming more similar as the economies complete the transition phase and have increasing trade 
and investment links with western Europe.  
Arabian Gulf 
Alkholifey (2002) reports that, unsurprisingly as they as are all highly oil-based, the correlations of 
output growth between the Gulf economies are high. For the same reason, their total trade with each 
other is very small, although as Jadresic (2002) notes, they buy large shares of non-oil exports from 
each other. Despite their common language, labour mobility among the Gulf states is relatively low. He 
notes that capital movements between the Gulf states are still restricted by regulation, lack of 
transparency and the absence of mutual listings in each other’s markets. 
Laabas and Limam (2002) find that the real exchange rates of the Gulf economies are closely related 
and note the political resolve as favouring an RCA. While intraregional trade is currently low and 
business cycles not that correlated, this may change following adoption of an RCA. 
Asia 
Wyplosz (2001) argues that, as Asian intraregional trade is already surprisingly high as a proportion of 
total trade, currency union may have less of a trade-enhancing effect in Asia. Defining shocks as 
residuals from time series models of real GDP, he finds they are much less correlated within Asia than 
within Europe (although there is a correlated subgroup of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand).  
Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) point to the much wider variation in the economic and financial 
conditions in Asia than was the case in western Europe. Some Asian financial markets are very open 
while others remain highly regulated and closed. Their empirical work suggests that “on standard 
optimum currency area grounds, the economies of east Asia would seem to be more or less as  
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plausible candidates for internationally harmonised monetary policies as the members of the European 
Union. While they do not satisfy all the standard OCA criteria, nor does Europe.” 
Bayoumi et al (2000) look at the ASEAN countries, note the high intraregional trade and find 
“underlying (aggregate supply) disturbances are relatively highly correlated across certain ASEAN 
countries, but the correlations are typically lower than they were in Europe ... the speed of adjustment 
is much faster in ASEAN, presumably reflecting the region’s more flexible labour markets ... [and] the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy is only slightly more diverse within ASEAN than in the 
euro area”. They conclude “overall, on the economic front ... ASEAN today is less suitable for a 
regional monetary arrangement than the euro area was before the Maastricht Treaty, but the 
differences are not large”. But politically, there is a lot further to go. 
Baek and Song (2002) note that intraregional trade is as high within east Asia as within western 
Europe. While manufactured goods are a similarly high proportion of exports in most Asian economies 
(not Brunei, Myanmar and Vietnam), there are significant differences in the type of manufactured 
exports, with Japan and Korea large exporters of heavy machinery but China and Indonesia exporting 
lower-value products. Using the approach of Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999), they find significantly 
correlated supply disturbances within Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand 
(and marginally so with Taiwan), suggesting these economies could form an OCA. Broadly the same 
group of economies have correlated demand shocks also. A similar study by Zhang et al (2003) 
concludes there are similar supply shocks among some ASEAN economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand) and among some east Asian economies (Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan) but demand and monetary shocks are not very correlated within Asia. Choi (2002), while 
generally supportive of Asian currency union in the long term, warns that labour mobility in most of 
Asia is much lower than in western Europe and that China and Japan face asymmetric shocks. For the 
subgroup of ASEAN countries, though, Madhur (2002) believes capital and labour mobility, and price 
and wage flexibility, compares well with Europe. 
Sabhasri and Janevathanavitya (2001) conclude that Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand (but not Indonesia) would be suitable candidates to join a yen currency area. Yuen (2000) 
suggests there are three pairs of economies that could each adopt a common currency; Malaysia and 
Singapore, Japan and Korea, and Hong Kong and Taiwan. These could later be joined by other 
economies to form “clusters” and eventually merge into a single Asian currency. 
But there remain large differences between some Asian countries. Even within China, Hong Kong 
does not yet form an OCA with the mainland, according to Tsang (2002). 
Oceania 
Counterfactual simulations by Grimes and Holmes (2000) lead them to conclude that a currency union 
of New Zealand with Australia (or the United States) would not impair the buffering role of the 
exchange rate. 
Americas 
Murray (1999) argues that Canada’s terms of trade move in opposite directions to those of the United 
States in response to fluctuations in commodity prices. He also cites work suggesting that structural 
shocks hitting Canada, Mexico and the United States share very few common characteristics, whereas 
those hitting regions within the United States are similar and those hitting the Canadian provinces are 
similar. However, Beine and Coulombe (2002) argue that it would be advantageous for the two largest 
Canadian provinces to use the US dollar. 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) conclude that the Mercosur countries do not constitute an OCA, 
and are unlikely to do so in the future. They argue the countries would be better off adopting the 
US  dollar. Compared to western Europe, there is much less trade and labour mobility among the 
members, wider differences in average income and less similarity in the shocks facing them. The euro 
had credibility from being seen as, in a sense, the successor to the strong Deutsche mark. For 
Mercosur to gain this kind of credibility, they would need to adopt the US dollar. 
Scandizzo (2002) reports that within the Andean Community the strongest output correlations are 
between the oil exporters Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, but these are below those between  
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European countries. Interregional trade is much smaller than within Europe, and well below that in 
Mercosur. The Andean countries also have very rigid labour markets. 
Temprano Arroyo (2002) says that no Latin American regions meet the traditional OCA criteria. 
However, taking into account aspects such as unofficial use of foreign currencies and credibility 
problems, there may be a case for monetary integration. Berg et al (2002) conclude Latin American 
countries do not constitute an OCA as they do not trade that much with each other, face diverse 
shocks and have uncoordinated business cycles. 
Africa 
Masson and Pattillo (2001) examine the project of creating a currency union among all the 
15 economies of West Africa. They note that the problem of asymmetric shocks (a key element of the 
OCA literature) is especially acute for the region, since Nigeria as a major oil exporter faces very 
different terms of trade to the other countries. Ogunkola (2002) concurs, adding that many African 
economies are dominated by (differing) single commodities. Masson and Pattillo (2001) also note the 
relatively low level of intraregional trade (see Table 3), which suggests that the transaction cost 
savings from a common currency might not be very great.  
Mkenda (2001) concludes that Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda tend to be affected by common shocks. 
USA 
There are also studies of whether existing countries are OCAs. Kouparitsas (2001) concludes based 
on sources and responses to shocks that while New England, the Mideast, Great Lakes, 
Rocky Mountains and Far West form an OCA, the Southeast, Plains and Southwest do not belong.  




Currency boards have by constitution full backing of the currency by foreign assets (Table B1). They 
also tend to have more foreign assets relative to the money supply than do central banks.  
 
Table B1 
Currency boards and central banks: size of foreign assets (end-2002) 
  % to currency  % to money base  % to broad money 
Currency  boards     
Argentina
1    164   84   20 
Bahamas    241   81   10 
Bosnia and Herzegovina    144    108    46 
Bulgaria   269   195   66 
Djibouti   130   116   20 
East  Caribbean   243   99  ... 
Estonia   214   128   33 
Hong Kong SAR    737    339    28 
Lesotho    2,143   770   178 
Macau  SAR    1,775   864   37 
Namibia    ...   293   27 
Median    242    116   31 
Other      
China    134   50   12 
Euro  area   95   55   6 
Japan   71   52   8 
United  Kingdom   19   23   1 
United  States   12   11   1 
1  End-2001. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, June 2003, lines 11, 14, 14a, 34, 35; Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. 
 
Currency boards were little discussed in the economics literature during the first decades of their 
existence. Interest in them surged after their readoption by Hong Kong in 1983 and Argentina in 1991. 
However, this literature generally made simplifying assumptions appropriate to the simple colonial 
currency boards but not to modern day systems; see Hawkins (2003b,c). One implication of these 
assumptions was an almost fixed relationship between currency and broad money. Table B2 shows 
this is not the case. 
While interest rates were less relevant in the colonial currency boards, they are crucial to 
understanding the transmission mechanism in modern day currency boards, as they are in 
understanding the operation of central banks. Inflation in modern day currency boards is determined 
by the effect of domestic interest rates (heavily influenced by those in the reserve currency economy) 
on domestic activity with non-tradable prices in the reserve currency economy providing a loose 
anchor. See Hawkins (2003b) for a fuller discussion and Ha et al (2002) for an econometric model of a 
currency board economy from a similar intellectual tradition.  
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Table B2 
Correlation of monthly change in monetary authority foreign assets with 
  Currency  Base money  Broad money 
Currency boards        
Argentina    Jan  1996-Dec  2000   0.60   0.60   0.36 
Argentina    Jan  2001-Dec  2001   0.11   0.45   0.71 
Bosnia & Herzegovina    Jan 1998-Dec 2002    0.87    0.99    0.89 
Bulgaria    Jan  1988-Dec  2002   0.35   0.40   0.24 
Djibouti    Jan  1996-Oct  2002   0.61   0.74  –0.01 
Estonia    Jan  1996-Dec  2002   0.50   0.85   0.15 
Hong Kong SAR    July 1997-June 1998    0.02    0.80    –0.93 
Hong Kong SAR    Jan 1999-Dec 2002    0.05    0.24    0.49 
Lesotho    Jan  1996-Nov  2002   0.02   0.03    –0.08 
Lithuania    Jan  1996-Oct  2002   0.14   0.08    –0.04 
Other economies        
Australia    Jan  1996-Dec  2002   0.26   0.15    –0.05 
Chile    Jan  1996-Dec  2002   0.52    –0.01   0.05 
Latvia    Jan  1996-Dec  2002   0.31   0.39   0.24 
United  Kingdom    Jan  1996-Dec  2002  –0.16   –0.04   –0.23 
United  States    Jan  1996-Sep  2002   0.23   0.24   0.14 
Source: BIS calculations based on data from IMF, International Financial Statistics. Foreign assets are line 11, currency line 
14a, money base line 14 and broad money the sum of lines 34 and 35. 
 
Another difference with the modern day currency boards is the existence of an active foreign 
exchange market. Arbitrage should keep market rates close to the official rate. Empirically it had been 
the case that deviations from the link rate were higher in Hong Kong SAR where only currency 
transactions were conducted at the link rate, than in Argentina, where convertibility had also applied to 
bankers’ deposits with the central bank. 
Table B3 
Short-term volatility of interest rates
1 
Currency boards  Other economies 
Argentina    Jan 1996-Dec 2000    52  Argentina    Feb 2002-Dec 2002  712 
Argentina    Jan 2001-Dec 2001    310  Australia    Jan 1996-Dec 2002    1 
Estonia    Jan 1996-Dec 2002    139  Chile    Jan 1996-Dec 2002    9 
Hong Kong SAR    Jan 1996-June 1997    28  Latvia    Jan 1996-Dec 2002    59 
Hong Kong SAR    July 1997-June 1998    65  United Kingdom    Jan 1996-Dec 2002    19 
Hong Kong SAR    Jan 1999-Dec 2002    5  United States    Jan 1996-Dec 2002    12 
Lithuania   Jan  1996-June  2002    88       
1  Average daily absolute changes in one-month money market rates; basis points. 
Sources: Bloomberg; national data.  
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Annex C: 
Seigniorage losses from adopting a foreign currency 
Seigniorage is the rate of return earned on central bank assets multiplied by currency on issue (less 
costs of printing the currency, but these are minor in all but the smallest economies). Table C uses the 
government bond yield (a risk-free domestic asset for the central bank, and an alternative source of 
funding for the government) as the rate of return for central bank assets. If currency on issues grows in 
proportion to GDP, a simple assumption consistent with observed patterns,
21 then if interest rates are 
unchanged seigniorage will be a constant proportion of GDP. The amounts in Table  C are not 
insignificant but are small relative to the output losses from currency and banking crises. 
 
Table C 
Currency seigniorage (% to GDP; average 1999-2001) 
China  0.7 
Indonesia 0.3 
Korea  0.2 
Singapore 0.1 
Thailand  0.1 
Brazil  0.8 
Mexico  0.3 
Hungary  0.5 
Poland  0.3 
Russia  1.4 
South Africa  0.2 
Advanced economies
1 0.1 
1  Simple average of Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
Source: Hawkins (2003a). 
 
Seigniorage calculations sometimes include below market interest rates paid on reserves banks are 
required to hold with the central bank. But even if a foreign currency is officially adopted, banks could 
be required to hold such reserves with a government department and so this quasi-tax could still be 
collected. Within an RCA it may be better for the regional central bank to do this and then share the 
proceeds among its members, perhaps after meeting the cost of bank supervision if this is conducted 
by the regional central bank. 
In a country with substantial currency substitution, the amount of domestic currency on issue will be 
correspondingly lower, and so the loss in seignoriage smaller. It is, however, quite hard to quantify this 
due to the many factors affecting currency/GDP ratios. Less developed financial systems, availability 
of high denomination banknotes, larger “underground” economies and other forms of tax evasion, 
lower crime rates, low acceptance of credit cards and electronic money all lead to higher usage of 
currency. Comparing domestic currency usage in economies with and without substantial currency 
substitution suggests currency is of the order of 1% of GDP lower in the latter on average. 
                                                       
21   Berg and Borensztein (2000) instead assume currency on issue will grow by 0.3% of GDP each year, the annual increase in 
the G7 countries over the 1990s. But some (or perhaps a lot) of the increased issue of G7 currency was being used outside 
the G7 so this may not be a good assumption for emerging economies. If forms of electronic money become prevalent 
currency may contract, although there has been minimal sign of this happening so far; see Hawkins (2001).  
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